

INTRINSIC VALUE:

Analysing Moore's Aristotelian approach¹

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Introduction

The aim of this article is to analyse a tension in Moore's ethics between two conceptions of intrinsic value. Taking Moore's own review of his work (RC: 555)², I shall refer to them as 'good in Moore's "own usage"' and 'goodness in Aristotle's sense.' In the first section, I shall scrutinise the texts where Moore states his own view pointing out the difficulties of his approach. In the second, I shall discuss Moore's commitment to the Aristotelian approach, maintaining that it provides a more adequate account of intrinsic value and that it occupies a central place in his ethics. In the third section, I shall try to develop this Aristotelian account avoiding Moore's misinterpretations and exploring features that he seems to neglect. In the concluding part, I shall point out that, if this interpretation of Moore's ethics is correct, it requires a re-assessment of some of the common interpretations of his meta-ethical commitments and it also leads to a different understanding of his normative ethics and some of its practical implications.

First of all, it is necessary to mark clearly the texts where Moore holds his own view and where he uses an Aristotelian approach. We can take, for this purpose, his own testimony: '...in my paper on "Is Goodness a Quality?" I said that I thought that the particular sense of "good" with which I had been concerned, was one in which "is good" meant "is an experience which is worth having for its own sake." This was a sheer mistake as to my own usage,' (RC: 555). If we then take a closer look at GQ, we find

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² The following abbreviations will be used throughout this paper: CIV for "The conception of intrinsic value" in PE; E for *Ethics*; EE for *The Elements of Ethics*; GQ for "Is Goodness a Quality?" in *Philosophical Papers*; NMP for "The Nature of Moral Philosophy" in *Philosophical Studies*; PE for *Principia Ethica*; PSE for "Preface to the Second Edition" of *Principia Ethica* in PE; RC for "A Reply to my Critics" (See Bibliography for complete references).

out that the sense which Moore is rejecting was used elsewhere: 'In *Principia* I asserted and proposed to prove that "good" (and I think I sometimes, though perhaps not always, was using this word to mean the same as "worth having for its own sake") was indefinable,' (GQ: 98). In NMP, which is mainly concerned with intrinsic value, Moore explicitly asserts that this conception is 'goodness in Aristotle's sense' (p.327). Consequently, we have three texts where intrinsic value means an experience worth having for its own sake, namely PE, NMP and GQ. By exclusion, the texts where Moore said that intrinsic value is analysed on different bases, that is, on his own 'proper' sense are E, CIV, PSE and RC. To be more precise: I believe that the tension between the two approaches to intrinsic value can be identified in PE and E and, afterwards, Moore's texts can be divided according to the two analytical models.

It is also necessary to point out that there is a *tension* between the two conceptions. For instance, in *Principia* beauty is an intrinsic value and it is a property that can exist in a world even if, hypothetically, no conscious being is there to contemplate it (PE: 135). But Moore also says that *the best* intrinsic goods are things worth having for their own sake, namely the contemplation of beauty and friendship (PE: 237) and then that 'nothing can be an intrinsic good unless it contains *both* some feeling and *also* some other form of consciousness,' (E: 107). Consequently, in PE and E he is sometimes defending his own view, sometimes using an Aristotelian approach.

1 - Good in Moore's 'own usage'

Let me then scrutinise each text where Moore's own view is defended. To start with, I would like to make a terminological observation. I shall also use the word 'objectivistic' to characterise Moore's own view because it amounts to a position that seems to exclude any relation between what is valued and the valuer. As Wright puts it (1993: 104), 'Moore did not think that intrinsic value was relative to subject and time. In this respect his "objectivist" notion of the intrinsically good and bad differs from our "subjectivist" notion of the in itself wanted or unwanted.' I would like to stress Moore's objectivism calling it objectivistic for reasons that will become apparent later.

According to Moore (GQ: 93), his first *explicit* attempt to clarify how he uses the expression 'intrinsic value' was made in *Ethics*, published in 1912. His analysis there is:

'By saying that a thing is intrinsically good it means that it would be a good thing that the thing in question should exist, even if it existed *quite alone*, without any further accompaniments or effects whatever,' (E: 27).

The same analysis is used to clarify what he means by intrinsically bad, intrinsically indifferent and intrinsically better or worse, that is, whether something should exist *quite alone* independently of any further qualification.

A first observation that is necessary to make on this analysis is that it presupposes the method of *absolute* isolation. According to this method, one must consider what things are such that, if they existed *by themselves*, in absolute isolation, we should yet judge their existence to be good (PE: 145, 236). This is the method of *absolute* isolation, that is, a thing must be 'considered by itself and as if alone' (Chisholm/Sosa 1966: 244).³ One function of this methodological device, as it is here presented, is to lead us to inspect a thing in its necessary and *internal* properties, that is, independently of any *relational* attribute either between things or between valuer and the bearer of value. The internality of value is constantly emphasised by Moore not only in *Ethics*, but also in CIV (p. 282-5) and RC (p. 579). Thus, the paper 'External and Internal Relations' (PS: 276-309) can shed some light on this point. Moore here tries to refute Bradley's theory that all relations are internal and uses 'internal' to describe the inner qualities and relations of a thing; 'external' is what is in *relation* to other things. That is why the non-relational characteristic of this approach to intrinsic value is rightly emphasised (Baldwin 1993: xxiv; Lemos 1994: 3). But Moore's way of putting the issue of internality, as we shall see, almost runs into naturalism.

Another feature of this approach then becomes apparent, that is, value is taken as a *necessary* property of something. To say that something has intrinsic value implies that it cannot be otherwise. As Moore puts it, it has value in an unconditional sense (CIV: 293); it is not contingent upon any circumstances (PSE: 22). Thus, for instance, a pleasant state of affairs is first evaluated 'in isolation,' that is, one should conceive a possible world in which only this state of affairs exists (Chisholm 1978: 123). Then, one must consider whether this state of affairs can be the case in every possible world. If it passes this test, it can be seen as a necessary property. There is no doubt that modal

³ This method is also used in *Principia* where Moore asks one to consider a thing as 'existing absolutely by itself' (p.236) and, presumably, was used in the above thought-experiment about the beautiful world. A problem of this approach is certainly that it may be committed to a strong form of value realism, namely of a Platonic kind. That is to say, intrinsic value would be a non-natural property subsisting by itself

concepts are central to an understanding of Moore's account of intrinsic value, since the terms 'necessity' and 'impossibility' are frequently used (CIV: 290). But the isolation approach, in the way it was developed by Chisholm and others, has become a subchapter of modal logic and has little application in ethics.

The basic criticism of this approach is that the appeal to modal categories is not sufficient to make the distinction between instrumental and intrinsic value. It amounts to epistemic claims, rather than practical ones. Whatever the logic of 'intrinsically better' (Chisholm/Sosa 1966), whatever the possible axiomatic features of 'good' (Hartman 1965), the *value* of something as a means or as an end-in-itself is not clarified. That is to say, the attribution of intrinsic or instrumental value depends not only on the inherent properties of something, but also on agent-related factors, for instance, choices. Thus, the exclusive stress on the modal categories is not sufficient to make the mentioned distinction. Moreover, as Bodanszky and Conne argue (1981: 52), one can just deny that the example given above has intrinsic value at all. Certainly, one can refuse, in a Moorean manner, the hedonist assumptions implicit in Chisholm's and Sosa's account (1966: 244). This shows that the method of *absolute* isolation fails to arrive at the correct bearers of intrinsic worth despite its apparent rigour. Consequently, a problem arises regarding the presumed *necessity* associated with intrinsic value. Chisholm recognises this and later (1981: 41 and 1986) defines intrinsic value in terms of the appropriateness of certain intentional attitudes, mainly preferability, following an Aristotelian tradition associated with Brentano. But the introduction of intentional attitudes implies a recognition that the objectivistic approach fails since the relation between what is evaluated and the valuer is excluded by the method of *absolute* isolation.

Moore himself was aware of the difficulties surrounding this way of analysing intrinsic value. In GQ, he recognises that his conception of intrinsic goodness, as presented in *Ethics*, could be seen as self-contradictory (p.93). He considers the objection that what is pre-analytically and commonly meant by 'intrinsically good' is in opposition to his account. That is to say, the common usage of intrinsic value does not have the connotation that it should exist, even if it existed quite alone (*Idem, Ibid.*). Thus, he accepts the critique that his account given in E fails to accommodate what is

outside space and time. As we shall see, Moore's Aristotelian approach to intrinsic value requires a more reasonable form of realism.

commonly meant by intrinsic value. It was for this reason that Moore started to look for (or to return to) an Aristotelian approach to intrinsic value.

The analysis given in *Ethics* really presents several difficulties. First, as Lemos points out (1994: 10-11), 'this sort of ontological isolationism is not very helpful since there are certain sorts of things that are intrinsically good but simply could not be the only things that exist.' His example is that the state of affairs *Peter experiencing pleasure* could not exist without Peter existing, without Peter having certain desires satisfied, without other things or persons causing pleasure, etc. (*Idem*, p.11). But this objection misses the point since Moore could make a rejoinder saying that the isolation test does not require a *simple* state of affairs. On the contrary, the bearers of intrinsic value are organic unities, that is, complex wholes. Lemos's objection has, however, a good point in claiming that the intrinsic value of something seems not to be related to its existence in *absolute* isolation. Can we consider, for instance, *Peter experiencing pleasure* good in *isolation*? Apparently, this is a good state of affairs, but it may happen in circumstances which it cannot be said that it is unconditionally good. Suppose that Peter is a pirate killing an innocent and enjoying it. It seems clear that the isolation test can lead to an error of evaluation if it is applied in this radical or absolute way. Thus, the method is really not very clear or helpful in establishing whether something has intrinsic value. Second, the method of *absolute* isolation relies on one's own intuition and this is not a secure basis for certainty and, consequently, for knowing whether a thing possesses a valuable property. Moreover, as O'Day correctly remarks (1999: 199), it cannot exclude the values that the valuer has when he makes the isolation test. For example, a hedonist would consider only pleasure as good in itself. Finally, it appears evident that this method yields in a somewhat vacuous 'all or nothing' position. It presupposes metaphysical questions such as whether existence is good or bad in itself. A nihilist could reject the existence of anything as good, preferring an empty universe as intrinsically good. Others would consider the existence in absolute isolation of trivial things, for instance a stone, as good in itself. This shows that the test for the existence or not of something 'considered by itself and as if alone' does not prevent us from making errors in evaluations, as Moore claimed that it should (PE: 236). There is, however, a less radical and more plausible way of applying the method of isolation which will be considered below.

Before examining the second text (CIV) where an objectivistic approach to intrinsic value is given, let me point out two errors that led Moore to abandon the use of the *analysans* 'worth having for its own sake' in *Ethics*, which is central in *Principia*. First, as White correctly notes (1958: 140), he incorrectly assumes that 'good for its own sake' is a synonym of 'ultimately good' (E: 31). Aristotle (1097^b7) and, more recently, Ross ([1930]: 73-4), kept these notions distinct. This is a mistake also made by recent ethicists, for example Korsgaard, who takes intrinsically good as a synonym of unconditionally good (1996: 263). As we shall see in the next section, there is a crucial difference between these two expressions, that is, what is good for its own sake can also be part of or a 'means' to something else, but what is ultimately good can never be part of or a means to something else. Second, Moore also incorrectly associates the *analysans* 'worth having for its own sake' with a subjectivistic account of intrinsic value. He erroneously thought that this *analysans* can only be used to describe one's own feelings or desires (E: 67-9). I think that Moore was right in rejecting subjective emotivism, but he throws the baby out with the water, so to speak, since it is possible to give an objective, though not an objectivistic, account of intrinsic value using the above mentioned *analysans*.

The second account of intrinsic value on an objectivistic basis appears in CIV written between 1914-17. Moore's analysis is:

'To say that a kind of value is "intrinsic" means merely that the question whether a thing possesses it, and in what degree it possesses it, depends solely on the intrinsic nature of the thing in question.' (CIV: 286)

Moore explains that what he means by 'depends solely on the intrinsic nature of the thing in question' involves two statements: (i) that it does not depend on circumstances whether the thing possesses it or not and (ii) that another thing exactly alike must possess the same degree of intrinsic value under all circumstances (CIV: 286-7). But there is an obvious different reading of the above analysis. If by 'intrinsic nature' we understand, as Moore did, the sum of the necessary properties of which a thing is composed of, then its intrinsic value, its goodness for example, being intrinsic, would be an inherent property of it. As Korsgaard puts it (1996: 255), intrinsic value would be a property that, for instance, we would be able to perceive or to recognise in things and would be independent of people's interests or desires or any other circumstances. Thus, giving a complete description of such a thing would include its goodness, since it

depends *only* on its intrinsic nature. Moreover, if a thing A is completely described and it includes the property *x* -which could be its goodness- and another thing B is exactly alike, then we would know *a priori* that B has the inherent property *x*. They would be only numerically different. Moore is assuming here, as Baldwin correctly observes (1993: xxiv), an essentialist position. This genuinely seems to eliminate the subjective features of evaluation and is the most objectivistic approach that Moore made to the question of intrinsic value. It now becomes apparent why his approach is not only objectivist, but objectivistic, that is intrinsic value depends *solely* on the intrinsic nature of something.⁴

This approach is certainly misleading. First, there is the problem of naturalism. Moore needs to reject the thesis that a complete description of all intrinsic properties of a thing would mention predicates of values, otherwise he would be an ethical naturalist, a view that he wants to criticise. That is to say, if value is an intrinsic property, an *internal* or *inherent* property of a natural thing, then it also seems to be a *natural* property of such thing. As Korsgaard notes (1996: 255), Moore would then be guilty of the naturalistic fallacy. However, Moore seems to deny that intrinsic value is an intrinsic natural property (CIV: 296). If he wants to avoid naturalism, he needs to point out that intrinsic value depends on the intrinsic nature of the thing that possesses it, but he *must* also stress that it is not an intrinsic property. As can be seen, instead of clarifying what intrinsic value is, Moore is in danger of assuming positions that he wants to deny.

Another problem is that the distinction between the intrinsic value and the intrinsic nature of something is, as Moore recognises (RC: 583), an 'exceedingly awkward piece of terminology.' One may say that it involves an appearance of circularity, that is, Moore is using the expressions *intrinsic* property, *intrinsic* nature to explain *intrinsic* value somehow begging the explanation. To overcome this appearance of circularity, he must say that intrinsic value depends on the intrinsic nature of a thing, but it is not itself an intrinsic property. In fact, he gives this account clearly in PSE, but, as we shall see presently, it does not avoid the appearance of circularity and it is not helpful in clarifying what intrinsic *value* is. Moreover, as Rohatyn correctly points out (1987: 97), there is an inconsistency in Moore's account of intrinsic value in CIV: on

⁴ As Brink observes (1989: 165), Moore defends a *strong* supervenience of moral properties on non-moral ones. A weaker dependence seems more plausible and the Aristotelian approach to intrinsic value can be compatible with it. For a clarification on the concept of supervenience see: Hare 1993: 66-81 and Blackburn 1984: 181-223.

one hand, Moore says that there are predicates 'which do *not* depend solely on the intrinsic nature of what possesses them,' (e.g. beauty) so that '...it is *not* true that if x possesses them and y does not, x and y *must* differ in intrinsic nature' (p.295) and, on the other hand, he also wrote: 'I do not see how it can be deduced from any logical law, that if A is beautiful, anything that were exactly like A would be beautiful too, in exactly the same degree,' (*Idem, Ibid.*). Rohatyn thinks that it is possible to avoid the inconsistency, but I believe that we should simply reject the analysis given in CIV. The reason is that it is misleading to hold a *strong* form of supervenience of intrinsic value on natural properties.

A serious deficiency in the above explanation of intrinsic value was again raised by Moore himself. In GQ (p.94), he says that an objection similar to that made against his previous analysis of intrinsic value given in E can be directed against this new account. He admits that 'here again many people would say (and perhaps they are right) that there are *no* senses in which we use the words "good" or "valuable"' (GQ: 94) as he describes them. This is the objection that Lamont raised against Moore's analysis of intrinsic value in CIV (1946: 220-1). He argues that the kind of internality Moore is thinking of 'is some part, property, or "predicate" (...) of the thing's own nature' (Lamont 1946: 220). But, since Moore needs to deny that intrinsic value is a *natural* property, the conclusion that Lamont arrives is sceptical: 'therefore there cannot possibly be any "intrinsic value" in accordance with the definition given' (*Idem, p. 222*). Again it was because he could not find any answer to this objection that he returned to an analysis of intrinsic value using an Aristotelian framework.

Before considering his new attempt to analyse intrinsic value, let me raise one more objection to the explanation given in CIV. Another reason why the objectivistic view is wrong is that the value of something cannot depend *solely* on the nature of that thing. In order to understand this, take the following example. The worth of gold depends on its intrinsic nature, its intrinsic properties such as incorruptibility. However, the value we ascribe to it does not depend *solely* on its intrinsic properties, but also on our choices which are based on our interests, desires, needs, etc.⁵ We can express this by saying that valuation is an agent-related (though not relative) and not an agent-neutral process. Value is not a feature of a thing. *Mutatis mutandis*, the same conclusion applies

to intrinsic value. Consider, for instance, Aristotle's description of the intrinsic properties of the philosophical life: it is the best activity; the most continuous; the pleasantest; the most self-sufficient; etc. (1177^a19-30). Now, despite the intrinsic properties of philosophy which assure its intrinsic goodness, one can engage in this activity *either* for instrumental reasons, for instance, for a living *or* because one ascribes it intrinsic worth.⁶ Therefore, I think that value depends on the nature of the thing, but *also* on what is considered valuable by an valuer and how s/he values it. It can be that we *recognise* that a thing has value because of its intrinsic properties, but the stipulation of value depends *also* (not exclusively) on factors related to the agent's circumstances. Both should be taken into consideration in order to explain what value is. That is why the objectivistic view is wrong.

A new attempt to clarify intrinsic value using an objectivistic conceptual framework is presented in PSE, written, according to Baldwin (1993: x), in 1921, but only published in 1993. Moore here says that he was anxious to spell out two statements about G (goodness as intrinsic value):

- '(1) *G is a property which depends only on the intrinsic nature of the thing which possesses it. (...)*
(2) *Though G thus depends only on the intrinsic properties of things which possess it, and is, in that sense, an intrinsic kind of value, it is yet not itself an intrinsic property.*' (PSE: 22)

Since the first statement is almost identical with that which appeared in CIV, I shall focus on the second. The new information here is that G is an intrinsic kind of value, but *not* itself an intrinsic property. Note that if one stresses that G is an *intrinsic* value, it seems clear that it is an inherent property, as the first statement leads one to think. As in the analysis given in CIV, Moore needs to deny this or he will be committed to ethical naturalism. But if we stress that *G is not itself an intrinsic property*, then another explanation is required. Let me give an example in order to try to illustrate this point. If I said that this bicycle has value, I could imply that it depends on its own nature, that is whether it has some properties (good shape and size, nice colours, etc.), but its value or

⁵ For example's sake, it is worth mentioning here two distinct attitudes towards material wealth: Aristotle says that 'it is merely useful and for the sake of something else' (1096^a7); Mill admits in *Utilitarianism* that money can be seek for its own sake.

⁶ As Feldman correctly points out (1998: 352), Moore's objectivistic account is not 'that special sort of intrinsic value that interests us as moral philosophers'. In ethics, we are concerned with the evaluation of actions, practices, customs, policies, ends, obligations, etc. which are inevitably related to some kind of relationship between them and what an agent considers worthy of choice. There is no way of explaining evaluation by taking only its object and leaving aside how the valuer evaluates. Evaluating is an agent-related process.

its intrinsic value is not another component of the bicycle itself as its wheels are. That is to say, it would be, to say the least, *very misleading* to think that apart from what makes the bicycle good (size, shape, colours, etc.), it has another property, namely goodness, as it has wheels. In this case, goodness would be a property existing, to put it in Kerner's terms (1966: 8), *in rerum natura*. That is why intrinsic value depends on the intrinsic nature of the thing that possesses it, but is not itself an intrinsic property. That is why also Moore must be careful in claiming that it is an internal property.

It is clear then that intrinsic value cannot be seen as a natural property. But what is it then? Here PSE does not shed new light: it only denies that G is an intrinsic property. When Moore tries to explain what he means positively, he says that in *Principia* this sense was implicit in phrases such as 'so far as the meaning of good goes, anything whatever may be good' (PSE: 22) and that propositions such as 'Pleasure is good' are always synthetic (*Idem, Ibid.*) Obviously, these two statements do not clarify anything about the nature of G. Furthermore, in the rest of the PSE (23-27), Moore repeats some of the thesis about what he meant by the '*intrinsic nature* of things' and 'intrinsic property' which already appears in his attempt to elucidate the meaning of intrinsic value in CIV. One should conclude then that Moore fails in PSE to give a satisfactory account of intrinsic value. Perhaps, this was the reason why he decided not to publish it. It is worth noting that the first published account on intrinsic value that followed the writing of PSE, is the Aristotelian one in NMP. This does not diminish the importance of the publication *now* of PSE and also does not show that the decision of the editor of the revised edition of *Principia* is wrong. What I am holding is that perhaps there were good reasons why Moore did not publish it. But, if this is correct, it shows that the analysis in CIV, which is also included in the revised edition, is not the most appropriate to understand the notion of intrinsic value in *Principia*. It would be better to publish "Is Goodness a Quality?" and "The Nature of Moral Philosophy". Therefore, Moore's attempts to understand intrinsic value using this path are condemned to failure. We must conclude that Moore's objectivistic view should be definitely rejected as inadequate to explain intrinsic value.⁷ However, intrinsic value can be better explained as what is worth having for its own sake. This account can be objective, without the above problems of the objectivistic view.

2 - 'Goodness in Aristotle's sense'

First of all, let me recall that, according to Moore (RC: 555), he uses the *analysans* 'worth having for its own sake' as a synonym of intrinsic value in PE, NMP and GQ. As I already pointed out, this approach is nominated in NMP as 'goodness in Aristotle's sense' (p.327). This shows that Moore's ethics has a strong Aristotelian influence. Thus, the aim of this section is to reconstitute and to assess this approach of intrinsic value. I shall also try to show that it is a more plausible account avoiding the problems of the objectivistic view.

Before examining Moore's analysis of intrinsic value as 'worth having for its own sake' in *Principia*, it is important to call attention to the influence of Aristotle on his previous work. As early as 1897, Moore was imaginatively including 'our brother Aristotle' among the Apostles, the Cambridge discussion society, referring to his definition of virtue and saying that 'he has discussed excellently well, as he almost always does' (ADD 8875/12/1/14: 14). At this time, Moore was making up his mind on moral matters using Aristotle and Kant and, according to his "Autobiography," he read Aristotle with Dr. Jackson in 1895. But the first publication that clearly shows an Aristotelian influence is the article 'Teleology,' a work that Moore in PE recommends as its complement (PE: 37). It is worth noting also that in the Syllabus for Moore's Lectures, now published as EE, he gave for general reference Plato's *Gorgias* and *Philebus*, Aristotle's *Ethics* and Sidgwick's *History of Ethics*. Furthermore, in EE, Aristotle's influence is greater than it is commonly recognised since he explicitly recommends for the Ideal *theoria* 'as it is found in the last book of Aristotle's *Ethics*,' (1991: 192). Obviously, this brings problems for Moore and the axiology of *Principia* no longer keeps this recommendation, but Aristotle is still discussed at some length, for instance, when Moore accepts his definition of virtue (PE: 220-231).⁸ Therefore, it is

⁷ Nagel's idea of overobjectification can be fairly applied to this view, that is, the temptation to interpret the objectivity of intrinsic values in too strong a way, that is, as if they should correspond to physical objects (1986: 162).

⁸ As we shall see in the next section, the method of isolation and the principle of organic unities which are two of the main foundations of Moore's ethics are already presented in Aristotle's ethics. Another clear evidence is Moore's sympathy with Brentano's work manifested in the preface of PE (p. 36): 'When this book had been already completed, I found, in Brentano's "Origin of the Knowledge of Right and Wrong" opinions far more closely resembling my own, than those of any other ethical writer with whom I am acquainted.' Now, as it is well known Brentano develops an Aristotelian account of intrinsic value. According to him (1969: 74ff), to say that an object is good is to say that it is correct to love that object and to say that it is bad is to say that it is correct to hate it. This is very near to what Aristotle held, namely that a choiceworthy object presupposes true reasoning and right desire (cf. 1139^a21-5). For a comment on

not without grounds that one can read *Principia* as using an Aristotelian account of intrinsic value, a point made by Moore himself.

Let me then analyse Moore's interpretation of goodness in Aristotle's sense. One of the first uses of the expression 'intrinsic value' in *Principia* is quite illuminating: it is contrasted with 'value as a means' (PE: 73). Despite the fact that PE does not give an explicit analysis of intrinsic value, the expressions 'ought to exist for its own sake,' 'good in itself,' 'intrinsic worth,' 'ought to be real' and 'good as an end' are used interchangeably. The *analysans* 'worth having for their own sake' is employed in several places (cf. PE: 237; 242; 264). But the most clear evidence is the *question* that Moore thinks is the task of ethics to answer: What kind of things ought to exist for their own sake? (PE: 33). Commentators normally overlook the importance of this *analysans* in *Principia*. Korsgaard (1996: 273) erroneously believes that it appears only in GQ.

There is an immediate clear advantage of this approach to intrinsic value. As Baldwin remarks (1993: xxv), 'We distinguish readily enough between things which are wanted *for their own sake* and things which are wanted only for their consequences without introducing any essentialist thoughts into the first category'. Thus, Baldwin sees as an advantage of the Aristotelian approach over the objectivistic one that it avoids essentialism. The difficulties relating to necessity and internality also disappear. Now, a problem with this analysis could be that 'ought to exist,' as Moore uses it, is not an appropriate way to explain whether an action ought to be done. As Paton points out, '...of good actions we should say that they ought to be done rather than that they ought to exist,' (1942: 115). Thus, one can object that 'ought to exist' is not the best way of saying that an action ought to be done, but not that the *analysans* 'worth having for its own sake' is problematic.

An initial conceptual clarification that is needed in order to understand intrinsic value as related to the means-ends logistic is the difference between what is a mere means and means as intermediate or subordinate ends. As is well known, Aristotle pointed out that we can have in the chain of means-ends different possibilities (1094^a1-17). Either something is merely a means to some end and has only extrinsic value or it has value in itself and can be seen as an end-in-itself. Now, the end which a given means is aimed at, even if it has intrinsic value, can itself be seen as a 'means', though

Brentano's conception of intrinsic value and a comparison with Moore's ethics see Chisholm 1986, mainly Chapter 7.

not a mere means, to some other end. In this case, the previous end is a new means to something else. To illustrate this difference, an instrument such as a flute is an example of a mere means; music can be an instance of an intermediate end since it has value in itself, but can also be seen as a 'means' or a part of a greater good such as an opera. As can be seen, once these distinctions are drawn, we need to introduce not only a rationality in terms of means-ends, but also in terms of parts-wholes in order to guarantee a correct apprehension of what is worth having for its own sake. Now, it is worth pointing out that this explains the difference between what has mere instrumental value and something that has value in itself, but can also be part of a greater good. However, both are distinct from an *ultimate* end, that is, what can never be a means to, or a part of, something else. It is important to realise that the *analysans* 'worth having for its own sake' applies to both an intermediate and ultimate end, but not to mere means. However, as we saw earlier, Moore conflates the concepts intrinsic value and ultimately good in *Ethics* and, as we shall see presently, in other works as well. Let me then explain how these distinctions work in *Principia*.

The main function of these concepts is to establish the elements of 'The Ideal' which, according to Moore (PE: 233), are the set of things that are good in themselves to a high degree. It is important to realise that he is using the means-ends logic to establish its elements. Thus, if we look carefully at the argument used by Moore in § 113 of *Principia*, the means-ends vocabulary is at work there. The method of isolation, in a *deliberative* sense (which will be explained later), establishes what is good as an end. That is to say, we have an ultimate end, some intermediate ends, and mere means to achieve them. In a possible interpretation of this argument, the ultimate end can be seen as the achievement of certain pleasant 'states of consciousness' (PE: 237). They are reached by what we can call intermediate means or ends, that is, in Moore's view, 'human intercourse and the contemplation of beautiful objects' (*Idem, ibid.*). It is for the sake of pleasant states of consciousness that one should seek human intercourse and the admiration of beautiful objects. We can then add, taking what Moore says immediately after that (*Idem, p. 238*), 'that it is only for the sake of these things ... that any one can be justified in performing any public or private duty; that they are the *raison d'être* of virtue'. Thus, virtuous actions are mere means to intermediate ends (e.g., human intercourse), which are means to the ultimate end.

I am neither suggesting that this is the best conception of the ultimate end nor accepting that virtue is a mere means. What I am arguing for is that the means-end logic is employed by Moore to establish what has intrinsic value or not, that he is using deliberative isolationism. Thus, if it is true that we can have things either as means or as ends and some of these ends can be transformed into new means to some new ends, then this chain of means-ends needs to be broken in some way. Otherwise, the ultimate end would never be established let alone achieved. This is a point made by Aristotle (1094^a21) and Hume as well (1996: 293) and it has been accepted by many ethicists as a valid one (Williams 1995: 82; Audi 1997a: 249, etc.). Now, one way of breaking this regress is to will something as an end in itself, that is for its own sake. Thus, it would be impossible for Moore to have established the components of 'The Ideal' without using the concept of good for its own sake. But despite the fact that it is a necessary condition, it is not a sufficient one. Moore needs the concept of ultimately good, that is, what it worth having for its own sake and never for the sake of something else. Perhaps, this feature is presented in *Principia* when he says that the unmixed goods are worth having *purely for their own sakes* (PE: 237). As Baldwin remarks (1993a: xxxiv and 1992: 132), this expression occurs only once in PE. It may be the case that the word 'purely' is here functioning as 'and never for the sake of something else.' Giving him the benefit of the doubt, it is reasonable to accept this interpretation. But it is also worth bearing in mind that in *Ethics* he conflates these concepts and in NMP, as we shall see next, the same mistake is made.

Let me then scrutinise another text where intrinsic value is analysed in terms of 'worth having for their own sake,' namely NMP, published in 1922. Moore there made a more detailed analysis of Aristotle's concept of intrinsic value. He argued that two main ideas are presented in Aristotle:

'first, that nothing can be good, in the sense he means, unless it is something which is worth having for its own sake, and not merely for the sake of something else; it must be good *in itself*; ...' and

'secondly, (what partly covers the former, but also, I think, says something more) it must, he says, be something that is "self-sufficient": something which, even if you had nothing else would make your life worth having,' (NMP: 324).

As can be seen, the first idea is closely connected with the above mentioned means-ends terminology. What is worth adding is that Aristotle had a generic name for the actions that are merely means to something else; they are part of *poesis* (making). The actions

that are ends in themselves belong to the category of *praxis* (acting). To recall the difference: 'For while making has an end other than itself, action cannot; for good action itself is its end,' (1140^b1). We *make* a house, but we *act* virtuously.

The second of Moore's comments is misleading. It adds something to the idea of intrinsic value, that is, it is self-sufficient. In fact, self-sufficiency has nothing to do with intrinsic value. As Aristotle pointed out (1097^b14), self-sufficiency is 'that which when isolated makes life desirable and lacking in nothing.' But one can be, for instance, virtuous, which has, according to Aristotle, worth for its own sake and still one's life might not be happy or self-sufficient. Therefore, Moore is misinterpreting Aristotle when he explained intrinsic value as worth having for its own sake and adds the concept of self-sufficiency. What Moore could have added to his first observation is actually another thing, namely the difference between intrinsic value and what is good without qualification, that is, 'that which is always desirable in itself and *never for the sake of something else*' (1097^b34, italics added). Aristotle's examples of the former are: excellence, pleasure, honour, reason. Or, if one prefers, let us take Moore's own list in *Ethics*: knowledge, love, enjoyment of beauty and moral qualities (p.102). They are things worth having for their own sake, but they could be 'means' to something else. However, only *eudaimonia* (happiness) is worth having for its own sake, but *never for the sake of something else*. That is why *eudaimonia* is the ultimate end. Thus, if Moore wants to establish something as an ultimate end, then he needs the concept of good without any further qualification. The notion of 'and never for the sake of something else' is a necessary condition to postulate the best components of 'The ideal'. If Moore did not fulfil this condition, then his postulation of the main element of 'The ideal' was totally arbitrary. That is to say, it is perfectly intelligible to ask to what end pleasant states of consciousness can be sought.

Moore also gives an account of intrinsic value in terms of worth having for its own sake in GQ, first published in 1932. The paper explicitly rejects the account of intrinsic value given in *Ethics* and in CIV and makes two important contributions. First, Moore distinguishes 'worth having' from 'worth having for its own sake':

"Worth having for its own sake" does not mean the same as "worth having"; since we may say of an experience, e.g. "That experience was *worth having* because it taught me a lesson", whereas to say "That experience was *worth having for its own sake*, because it taught me a lesson" would be self-contradictory; though, of course, to say "That experience was worth having *both* for its own sake *and* because it taught me a lesson" is not self-contradictory and may perfectly well be true' (GQ: 94).

The difference is clear and it can be synthesised as between extrinsic value (worth having) and intrinsic value (worth having for its own sake). That is to say, the distinction is between value and intrinsic value, a point explicitly made also in E (p. 30). Now, the reasons why Moore rejects the Aristotelian account in RC seems mistaken. Obviously, it is self-contradictory to say 'That experience was *worth having for its own sake*, because it taught me a lesson,' (GQ: 94), but this is not a good reason to reject the *analysans* 'worth having for its own sake'. It only shows that the *analysans* was wrongly applied. Another reason is given by Moore himself: 'I still think it is true that any experience which is worth having for its own sake *must* be "good" in the sense I was concerned with; but it was a sheer error to imply that, conversely, any state of things which is "good" in the sense in question must be an experience worth having for its own sake,' (*Idem, Ibid.*). Moore is right in holding that any experience worth having for its own sake must be good and that not everything that is good is an experience worth having for its own sake. However, this is not something that the Aristotelian approach denies. On the contrary, it is emphasised by the distinction between inherent goodness and intrinsic value. For these reasons, I believe that we should disqualify Moore's rejection in RC of the Aristotelian account of intrinsic value.

The second important clarification, though not a conceptual one, that Moore makes in GQ is related to the possible bearers of intrinsic worth. Regarding this point, he wrote:

'It will be noticed that if we do use "intrinsically good" in this sense, we are using it in a sense in which nothing but an experience *can* be "intrinsically good", since nothing but an experience can be "had" in the sense in which an experience is "had": nothing but my experiences can be "mine" in the same sense of "mine" in which they are "mine", (GQ: 95).

Thus the only possible bearers of intrinsic value in the present conception are, according to Moore, *experiences*. In *Principia*, there is a strong reason for supporting this view, namely that all bearers of intrinsic value, being organic unities, involve as a fundamental constituent, consciousness (PE: 237).⁹ This is another reason why the Aristotelian approach is the more fundamental in PE. However, this account cannot be identified

⁹ As Lemos puts it (1994: 93): 'The "consciousness thesis" tells us that nothing can be intrinsically good or bad unless something is conscious.' Obviously, this thesis is not committed to the view that only states of consciousness or mental states have intrinsic value. It merely calls attention to the fact that intrinsic value is agent-related. Perhaps the situation here is similar to the following: one *understands* what love is only if one has an experience of it.

with what has recently been called by Audi 'axiological *experientialism*' (1997: 254).¹⁰ An Aristotelian approach to intrinsic value does not need to restrict itself to states of mind as the only things worth having. Aristotle himself held that virtues, which are ways of being and not experiences, are worth having for their own sake. That is why the *analysans* 'worth having for its own sake' needs to be expanded in order to include other gerundives verbs such as *doing* for obligatory actions, *being* for virtues, etc. or, perhaps, even to be transformed into the variable 'worth \emptyset ing for its own sake.'

To conclude this examination of Moore's interpretation of goodness 'in Aristotle's sense,' let me leave him with his own words:

'Now suppose we say: I use the phrase "intrinsically good" to mean precisely the same as "worth having for its own sake"; and I use the expression "'Good", in this usage, stands for an intrinsic character' to mean precisely the same as "'Good"., in this usage, means the same as "worth having for its own sake"' It seems to me that, if we say this, we have given a clear explanation of how we use "intrinsically good", and also of how we use "'Good", in this usage, stands for an intrinsic character'; and that many people do actually use the expressions in this way,' (GQ: 94-5).

Finally, Moore is arriving at a plausible elucidation of intrinsic value, despite the fact that common sense is not the best philosophical criterion.

3 - Fostering Moore's Aristotelian approach

Before developing this approach to intrinsic value, I would like to call attention to two other major influences of Aristotle on Moore's ethics. First, the method of isolation, as Hill (1976: 62) points out, was used by Aristotle. This is indeed the case since Aristotle wrote: 'What sort of goods would one call good in themselves? Is it those that are pursued even when *isolated* from others, such as intelligence, sight, and certain pleasures and honours?' (1097^b16-7, italics added). This method can be applied in two different ways and I shall return to it presently. Second, the principle of organic unities is, as Brunius notes (1965: 23), 'formulated in chapter 7 and 8 of *The Poetics* by Aristotle.'¹¹ Certainly, Aristotle has in mind, perhaps not in an explicitly way, the principle of organic unities when he says that *eudaimonia* 'is the most desirable of all

¹⁰ According to Audi, experientialism is the view that 'only states of experience have intrinsic value (or intrinsic disvalue), where these states are construed purely psychologically, roughly as mental states or process,' (1997a: 254). The view to be avoided here is Bloomsbury's interpretation of PE, namely 'nothing matters except states of mind' (Keynes 1972: 436).

¹¹ The principle of organic unities 'is that the intrinsic value of a whole is neither identical with nor proportional to the sum of the values of its parts,' (PE: 233). As Ross correctly saw ([1930]: 70), this principle is abstractly correct, but one must be careful in applying it since it cannot be generalised to all kinds of value.

things, without being counted as one good thing among others; if it were so counted it would clearly be made more desirable by the addition of even the least of goods,' (1097^b16-18). Consequently, Aristotle's influence is beyond doubt and, as far as I know, no one has sufficiently explored the Aristotelian grounds of the concept of intrinsic value in Moore's ethics.

I would like now to develop a clearer analysis of intrinsic value using this Aristotelian approach and then spell out some of its advantages over the objectivistic view. I think that Moore has the merit of attempting to overcome a subjectivistic account, but he went well beyond objectivity. Moreover, he did not extract all the potentialities of the Aristotelian approach. This can be developed in such a way that it avoids subjectivism without falling into an objectivistic view. To achieve this, I shall use Moore's own conception of analysis. Obviously, we have simply to forget all the confusions that he made between analysing and defining intrinsic value. First, it is unanalysable only in a specific sense, namely in *natural* and *metaphysical* terms, but not in principle and, certainly not, in *ethical* terms.¹² Second, if even 'good' is logically simple it does not follow that it stands for a simple property. There is an asymmetrical relation here that Moore neglects. Third, his rules for analysing given in RC (663-666) are not promising and may well lead to the paradox of analysis. That model, applied to intrinsic value gives us trivial results such as Duncan-Jones's 'worth-havingness thesis': 'the concept of a thing's being intrinsically good is identical with the concept of being worth having for its own sake' (1970: 325). Consequently, I shall use Moore's analytical model as presented in "What is Analysis?" (1966: 153-164). He exemplifies it using the concept of cause: 'x caused y means x preceded y & whenever an event like x has been observed it has also been observed an event like y followed the event in question,' (*Idem*, p.155). Analysis, here, makes explicit the necessary and sufficient conditions to apply a concept. Moore says that this is a paragon of conceptual analysis, though his analysis of causation is 'not a correct one' (*Idem*, p.156). The analysis seems unsatisfactory because it only makes explicit that *x* precedes *y* in time and that they may be contiguous in space, but it does not explain the *necessary connection* between the

¹² This can be shown by a reconstruction of the naturalistic fallacy argument in terms of a categorial mistake as it appears in PE (p.64) and, perhaps in PSE (p.21). Thus, evaluation is categorially distinct from description; normativity is categorially distinct from factuality. Any reductionism of one to another is a gross mistake. But, intrinsic value is not indefinable in any relevant sense. Consequently, *pace* Darwall *et al.* close the open-question argument.

observation of x and y . Now, this model was used by Klemke who elaborates an analysis of knowledge using Moore's epistemology. According to Klemke (1969a: 137), to say that 'x knows p' implies that: (1) x directly apprehends p; (2) x believes p; (3) p is true; and (4) x has adequate evidence for p. Despite the fact that the first condition seems superfluous, we can use Klemke's Moorean analysis of knowledge as a model to analyse intrinsic value.

Taking into consideration the problems of Moore's 'own usage' of good and some of the advantages of his use of goodness in Aristotle's sense, we may present a better analysis of intrinsic value. To say that a state of affairs has intrinsic value implies that it is: (i) choiceworthy by itself; (ii) valuable in itself and (iii) worth 'having' for its own sake. Once these conditions are fulfilled, the concept of intrinsic value can be correctly applied. I shall refer to this analytical model as 'Moore's Aristotelian approach' to intrinsic value.

This preliminary analysis needs some further clarifications. Consider the case where A values x . The first condition says that A chooses x since A desires, prefers or has a qualified interest on x . However, x is not good *because* it is desired by A. On the contrary, A chooses x given that it has value in itself. Here the deliberative method of isolation helps A to choose since x may be judged valuable in isolation, by itself.¹³ It does not require ontological isolationism, that is having to consider whether x is valuable even if it existed *quite alone*, as E demands. Deliberative isolation here is enough, that is x is chosen in and by itself. Thus, Moore's radical or absolute method of isolation is devalued in order to accommodate it to deliberative isolation. The result is that x is choiceworthy by itself; it cannot be reduced to extrinsic value.

The second condition states, to illustrate with Frankena's distinction (1963: 65), for example, the *inherent* goodness, but not yet that it is *intrinsically* good, that is, good as an end in itself. In other words, x has worth *tout court*. Note, however, that it says that x has *worth* in itself and this means that it could be good, right, beautiful or whatever. To say that x has worth in itself means, using Moore's way of expressing it, to say that whether x has value *depends* on its intrinsic properties. However, it does not assume the objectivistic thesis that it depends *solely* on the intrinsic nature of x , as CIV and PSE did. But it depends on the *way* A is having x .

The third necessary condition reveals that x has intrinsic value, that is, that A is having x for its own sake. Intrinsic value, here, is a practical concept: good-as-an-end is contrasted with good-as-a-means. In other words, it says that A is having x not in an instrumental way, but for itself. This requirement makes clear that intrinsic value is a property of things which is agent-related. But, it is agent-related and neither agent-relative nor agent-neutral. Consequently, it is clear that intrinsic value is a relational concept. A does not regard x merely as a means; A has it for its own sake. It has more than instrumental value.

Let me give an example in order to illustrate this analysis. Take a virtue, for instance, justice. It may fulfil condition (i), that is, A may choose it because it is worthy of choice by itself. In other words, it has value independently of anything else. It also satisfies condition (ii): justice is good in itself or a fair act is right in itself. That is to say, its value depends on its internal properties, for example, an equal distribution of a good. Thus, equality is a property that makes justice good in itself. Justice is good *sans phrase*. This means that even if justice can be seen as part of a greater good, it is not reducible to instrumental value. Finally, condition (iii) also may be met when someone acts fairly for its own sake. That is to say, just acts are good in themselves and even if nothing else follows, they retain their value. Note, however, that this analysis of intrinsic value does not commit one to the view that it is an ultimate value, an unconditional good. To arrive at this notion we need, as we have seen, to satisfy another condition, that is, that x is *never* willed for the sake of something else.

As can be seen, there is a less radical way of applying the test of isolation. One needs to consider, as Moore sometimes does in *Principia* when he judges the value of virtue (p.236), simply whether something is a mere means to something else or an end in itself. This is not the method of *absolute* isolation. But a thing is still judged in isolation, that is, in itself. This is what O'Day calls a less 'radical' version of Moore's procedure (1999: 198). However, O'Day reconstructs Moore's method in terms of which relational properties we isolate a thing from. I think that it is more promising to consider it in terms of whether something is a mere means or an end in itself. This is a 'deliberative isolationism,' as contrasted with what Lemos called ontological isolationism (1994: 10). Deliberative isolationism is then a simple heuristic device

¹³ The *deliberative* method of isolation determines whether what one regards as an *end* in really and *end*, or whether it is only a useful *means* to some greater *end*. Moore seems to use this method as a way of

which asks us to analyse whether something is being considered an end in itself or merely a means. In other words, the basic question is whether what is valued is for its own sake or for the sake of something else. This is certainly a less radical way of applying the method of isolation.

What is the main advantage of this analysis over the objectivistic approach? Apart from the fact that it avoids the difficulties raised above, it has merits of its own, mainly it can be better contrasted with *instrumental* value and in this way explain, for example, the value of moral actions. Moore himself, in a review seemingly forgotten by all commentators, namely of Santayana's book *The Life of Reason* (1905-6: 250), contrasts intrinsic value with instrumental value. The objectivistic analysis, as we have seen, does not allow for a clear distinction between these two concepts. The difference is that what has value only as a means to something else has merely extrinsic or instrumental value. What cannot be seen in such a reductive manner, has intrinsic value. For instance, instrumental acts are appropriate means to achieve some desired end. They have no intrinsic value. But the actions that are good in themselves, for instance, just ones, have intrinsic value in the mentioned sense. It is evident that this kind of intrinsic worth is generally associated with moral ones. We certainly think that manipulatory actions (to treat others merely as instruments of our desires or interests) are immoral. Nothing seems worse in the moral sense than to use another person merely for one's own interests. That is why respect for persons has intrinsic value. Moreover, we think also that when other values override moral values, the latter lose their authority and the person acts immorally. For instance, if someone lies in the name of a high economic profit, then a moral value (e.g., truthfulness) is overridden by non-moral values. That is why it seems clear that moral values such as honesty have worth for their own sake. But this does not mean that honesty can never be desired for the sake of something else. Honesty could be seen as a good 'means' to, or a part of, a better society. Consequently, the non-instrumental value of morality is better described by Moore's Aristotelian approach.

Now, if this interpretation of Moore's more fundamental notion of intrinsic value is correct, then Korsgaard's criticisms are unjustified. In her influential paper "Two distinctions in goodness" (1996: 249-274), she argues that both Kant and Moore separates the two distinctions in goodness (intrinsically good/extrinsically good and

testing whether of not duties or virtues are intrinsically valuable (PE: 221). I shall return to this point later.

valued for its own sake/valued for the sake of something else) and that both have sources to separate intrinsic value from a thing being desired for its own sake. She also argues that Kant's account is superior: a) it is more flexible to describe kinds of everyday matters of value; b) it does not take mental states as ends; c) it explains what is good for us, that is, something is valuable because we desire (*Idem*, p.262). Moore's problems are: a) the method of isolation veils or obscures the internal relations of organic unities; b) he needs an intuitionist support; c) goodness is a mysterious ontological attribute (*Idem*, p.270ff.). However, this is true only if one takes the objectivistic view into account. The account of intrinsic value in Aristotelian terms avoids Korsgaard's criticism: the method of isolation is applied in a specific way; goodness is not longer a mysterious property; and the intuitionist support is not necessary. Moreover, I think some thesis of her 'Kantianism' would be rejected by Kant (e.g., that we 'ascribe' value to things [*Idem*, p.262]), but this does not need to concern us here. The central point is that Korsgaard does not realise what is Moore's most fundamental account of intrinsic value. The Aristotelian approach not only avoids her criticism, but has indeed advantages over her 'Kantian' view. For example, Korsgaard conflates intrinsically good with unconditionally good (1986: 262) and this is, as we saw, certainly wrong.¹⁴ Moreover, in Kant's ethics only a good will is unconditionally good and not any action done in accordance with the Categorical Imperative. To be intrinsically good is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for something to be unconditionally good. We must conclude then that she needs to make some more distinctions in goodness.

Final observations

In conclusion, I would like to mention some of the other advantages of Moore's Aristotelian approach over his objectivistic one. The main meta-ethical ones are: a) it reveals the non-priority thesis, that is both 'good' and 'right' may be defined in terms of intrinsic value; b) it keeps the distinction between facts and values, that is they are categorially distinct (an evaluation is not a description; a normative judgement is not an existential one); c) it is objective without overobjectification; d) it is compatible with a

¹⁴ Korsgaard is right when she says that by definition intrinsic value does not mean worth having for its own sake (1996: 250). However, this is not a sufficient reason for holding that intrinsic value cannot be analysed using this expression and it is, certainly, not a good reason for saying that this analysis cannot be used to distinguish instrumental and non-instrumental value.

more reasonable form of value realism: seeing beautiful objects; having pleasant experiences; having friendly social relationships; being virtuous; knowing things are real states of affairs; e) it is compatible with a more plausible moral psychology, namely internalism.

The main normative implications are: a) it shows a possible way of overcoming both utilitarianism and intuitionism; b) it requires a *constitutive* (not merely instrumental) account of practical reasoning which is made explicit by the principle of organic unities; c) it allows for deontic constraints within a 'teleological' framework (what is an *end-in-itself*) since it may incorporate both self-regarding duties (e.g. temperance) and other-regard concerns (friendship in Aristotle's sense is altruistic [1155^a32]). From the normative tenets, it follows some practical implications as well: a) it makes it possible to analyse obligatoriness and rightness as valuable in themselves (perhaps *prima facie* duties) and b) it shows that virtues are worth having for their own sake. Obviously, I cannot discuss all these implications here, but I hope to have made them plausible by providing a clear analysis of Moore's Aristotelian approach to intrinsic value.

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¹⁵ Moore's unpublished material is quoted in accordance with 'The papers of George Moore (1873-1958),' as organised by Katheen Cann in 1995, in the Cambridge University Library's Catalogue.

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